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 CT  Options to Protect Coastlines and Secure 
Maritime Jurisdictional Claims in the Face of Global 
Sea Level Rise 
Clive Schofield and David Freestone 
 A  1. Introduction 
It is now widely accepted that significant sea level rise is taking place and that this 
phenomenon is likely to accelerate in the future. This poses potentially disastrous 
implications for many coastal States, especially those with large and heavily 
populated low-lying coastal areas, as well as small low-lying island States. In 
addition to the essentially terrestrial, inward-looking threat posed to low-lying coastal 
areas and their associated populations from inundation by rising seas, threats also 
exist looking outward from the land to the ocean spaces adjacent to such threatened 
territories. In particular, sea level rise has the potential to significantly affect national 
claims to maritime jurisdiction all the way to the outward extent of maritime zones. 
Generally, the coastal baseline from which States’ maritime zones are 
measured is the “normal” low-water line. From this baseline States may measure 
their territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf. 
Consequently, if the low-water mark recedes as a result of inundation and sea level 
rise, this may affect the measurement of all of a country’s maritime zones. Because 
coastal States’ baselines are predominantly based on the “normal” low-water line, if 
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those “normal” baselines recede as a consequence of sea level rise, so too will the 
maritime zones measured from such baselines, leading to the erosion of the coastal 
State’s maritime claims. Further, sea level rise has the potential to inundate small 
islands and other geographical features that may also be used as critical basepoints in 
the definition of the limits of claims to maritime jurisdiction. This too may have 
major impacts on the capacity of an insular feature to generate maritime jurisdictional 
claims. 
This chapter begins by outlining some of the issues and uncertainties 
associated with the phenomenon of global sea level rise with an emphasis on its 
uneven impacts both temporally and spatially. Next, the chapter explores potential 
impacts stemming from sea level rise. It then assesses several responses open to 
coastal States in the face of rising sea levels. These responses include both the 
construction of physical defenses, notably in the form of sea defenses, and emerging 
“soft” engineering strategies and more adaptive planning measures. The final options 
discussed to preserve maritime jurisdictional claims are legal; among these are 
options to preserve maritime jurisdictional claims despite the inundation of coasts, 
including the fixing of normal baselines and/or the maritime jurisdictional limits 
derived from them. The chapter critically appraises some of these options and 
proposals open to coastal States seeking to address and adapt to the challenges posed 
to their maritime jurisdictional rights by sea level rise, drawing on the relevant 
scholarly literature that has developed on this topic over the past two decades. 
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 A  2. Sea Level Rise: Complexities and Uncertainties 
Significant evidence exists to support the contention that climate change is already 
having multiple, sustained, extremely serious, and real impacts on the oceans. Indeed, 
there now exists broad agreement in the scientific community as to the reality of 
rising sea levels on a global scale. Chapter 2 discusses in detail the current state of 
scientific knowledge about the pace and causes of sea level rise and the 
accompanying uncertainties. As it shows, sea level rise is a phenomenon that exhibits 
marked spatial and temporal variability. Sea level varies diurnally, under the 
influence of the tides, but also seasonally, regionally and interannually.1 Moreover, 
the impacts on a particular coastline are substantially dependent on its particular 
characteristics, such as the morphology of the seabed immediately offshore. 
Uncertainties also arise in determining the extent of actual sea level rise 
against the backdrop of ongoing long-term cyclical changes. However, even 
relatively modest sea level rise has the potential to have severe consequences and 
pose major challenges for coastal States. 
 A  3. Threats Posed by Sea Level Rise 
 B  3.1. Threats to Land 
The most immediate concern for coastal States is the threat that sea level rise could 
lead to the inundation of substantial, valuable, and populated parts of their land 
territory. Such a scenario could in all probability result in the large-scale 
displacements of coastal-dwelling populations and the loss of associated properties 
and infrastructure. Even without total or periodic inundation, sea level rise would be 
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likely to make such low-lying areas more vulnerable to extreme weather events such 
as storm surges, thus rendering them less and less habitable. A further consequence 
could be increasing saltwater intrusion and the loss of valuable habitats such as 
coastal wetlands, some of which are protected by international treaties.2 Alarm bells 
over these threats were rung by a number of scholars at least two decades ago.3 
These threats pose an especially problematic prospect in light of the fact that 
there is a general migration trend from rural to urban areas and from interior/highland 
to coastal areas. Indeed, coastal areas represent the most populated parts of the global 
landmass. One study estimates that sea level rise of one meter would inundate 
territory presently occupied by around 60 million people.4 Significant sea level rise 
would therefore necessarily pose daunting socioeconomic, environmental, and human 
security challenges on a global scale. 
 B  3.2. Threats to Maritime Jurisdiction 
In addition to threats to land territory, sea level rise could potentially result in 
significant reductions in the spatial extent of national claims to maritime jurisdiction. 
Changes to coastlines and therefore to baselines leading to the potential submergence 
of key basepoints from which claims to maritime jurisdiction are measured could 
have huge and incremental impacts on national claims to maritime jurisdiction. 
Reductions in the size of zones to which certain coastal States may be entitled are 
likely to have profound economic as well as jurisdictional consequences, because 
rights over these maritime spaces dictate exploitation rights over valuable resources 
that might also therefore be lost. Low-lying island States, such as Kiribati, the 
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Maldives, the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu, which have geographically restricted 
territory,5 appear to be especially vulnerable to these threats. This type of threat is 
likely to be exacerbated where island groups are particularly dispersed and critical 
basepoints, on which broad maritime jurisdictional claims depend, come under threat. 
However, just as sea level rise is understood to be a spatially and temporally 
uneven phenomenon, so too are the impacts of sea level rise in light of the variability 
and complexity of coastlines. A vertical sea level change applied to a relatively steep 
coastline will have an insignificant impact in terms of the horizontal position of the 
normal baseline. Where the gradient of the coastline is shallow, however, even a 
relatively slight vertical change can result in substantial shifts in the position of the 
baseline horizontally. However, it is by no means the entire normal baseline that 
contributes to the outer limits of a maritime claim. Thus if the critical controlling 
basepoints are not affected, then the relevant maritime limits will also not move. 
 B  3.3. Implications for Islands 
Sea level rise has significant potential consequences for islands and their inhabitants. 
Most obviously, it could lead to the inundation of parts or even the entirety of the 
land territory of certain islands, forcing the displacement of significant numbers, or 
even all, of their inhabitants. Although the total inundation of inhabited islands as a 
direct result of sea level rise has apparently yet to occur, in certain cases, such as that 
of the Cateret Islands of Papua New Guinea, the relocation of threatened populations 
is already planned and ongoing (see  later discussion). 
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Even if the total inundation of island territory does not take place (at least in 
the short term), climate-change-related impacts could make it increasingly untenable 
for island communities to be sustained on certain islands, forcing their populations to 
leave.6 Indeed, even a relatively slight rise in sea level, of a few tens of centimeters, 
could render certain islands uninhabitable by, for instance, increasing the incidence 
of severe flooding or curtailing the availability of potable water.7 For example, 
although Fongafale Island, the largest island in Funafuti Atoll, Tuvalu, reaches an 
elevation of 1.2 m, a sea level rise of 0.6 m would submerge the island’s central 
depression, which lies between its elevated storm and lagoonal ridges. Many of its 
population of around 5,000 live there.8 Similarly, only one island, Kanton Island, in 
Kiribati’s Phoenix Islands group, is presently inhabited; several other islands in the 
group supported populations in the past, but no longer can because of a lack of 
potable water.9 
Sea level rise also has the potential to threaten the insular status of certain 
features. For example, an island that is presently always above water level may, as a 
consequence of sea level rise, disappear during high tide, thus being reduced to the 
status of a low-tide elevation. (features that are exposed at low tide but are 
submerged at high tide). Under Article 13 of the LOSC, low-tide elevations may only 
act as basepoints if they fall wholly or partially within the breadth of the territorial 
sea measured from the baseline of a State’s mainland or island coasts.10 
Consequently, such features have been termed “parasitic basepoints.”11 As a result, if 
sea level rise causes certain features to be reduced to the status of a low-tide 
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elevation or to be submerged entirely, the coastal State concerned could lose 
significant maritime rights.12  
As a result, it could be Alternatively, sea level rise could lead to the 
reclassification of a feature from being an, as it were, ‘full’ island, from which claims 
to the full range of maritime zones may be made, to one of the categories of insular 
formation from which only restricted maritime claims can be made. In particular, 
Article 121(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) of 
1982 states that “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life 
of their own” are incapable of generating exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or 
continental shelf rights.13 The significance of such a change of insular status is 
illustrated by the United Kingdom’s reclassification of Rockall from full “island” to 
“rock” status, resulting in the loss to the United Kingdom of around 60,000 square 
nautical miles of maritime space previously claimed as part of the United Kingdom’s 
fishery zone.14 
  
Whether the threats to the ability of islands to support habitation and thus, 
ultimately, to the viability of small Island States are solely (or even largely) the 
consequence of climate change and sea level rise is open to debate. Coral cays, for 
example, may naturally be subject to evolution and decay over time.15 Conversely, it 
may be that some of these features are capable of natural adaption to sea level rise 
over time; evidence suggests that coral islands are remarkably robust and enduring 
features, with the geological record indicating that atolls have survived sea levels a 
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half-meter higher than present levels.16 Kench indicates that recent evidence from the 
Maldives suggests that the sea level rose by a half-meter around 2,000–4,000 years 
ago, after the islands in question were formed, yet the islands developed and 
remained above sea level.17 Similarly, Webb and Kench, in an analysis of twenty-
seven coral atoll islands in the central Pacific Ocean, found that 86% of these 
features had either remained stable or increased in area over a 20- to 60-year 
timescale despite a reported sea level rise in the central Pacific region.18 This 
phenomenon is discussed further in Chapter 2, but at the least runs counter to 
widespread perceptions that sea level rise will inevitably lead to the erosion of island 
shorelines. 
A critical issue in this context is the health of coral island ecosystems, as is 
also highlighted in Chapters 2 and 15. Rising populations, land use changes, 
pollution, and building work along the coast, including the construction of 
breakwaters, seawalls, and other sea defenses, can adversely affect the health of coral 
reefs. In particular such interventions can reduce calcification rates, leading to greater 
erosion as opposed to coral build-up. Further, the interruption of natural sediment 
flow regimes can compromise the ability of coral islands to adapt to changing sea 
levels, undermining the island’s natural ability to adapt to sea rise.19 
 B  3.4. Total Inundation of States 
The complete or significant inundation of low-lying States, particularly island States, 
poses a number of novel legal problems. If the sea level continues to rise steadily, as 
many scientists predict, this could cause an existential crisis for a number of States. 
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Although it does not seem imminent, a number of States have been identified that 
could be rendered uninhabitable by a one-meter rise in sea level and a subsequent 
increase in storms, flooding, and the loss of the freshwater lens; that is, the layer of 
freshwater accumulated from rainfall floating on top of denser saltwater. The 
question is whether such a State, such as the Maldives, could continue to exist if its 
land area is completely submerged by the sea or so much of it is under water that it 
cannot sustain sufficient population to have “an economic life of its own,” as 
required by Article 121(3) of the 1982 LOSC. That said, the lack of specificity in the 
language of Article 121(3), coupled with the flexible interpretation of these 
provisions in State practice should be borne in mind.  
Such a scenario would raise fundamental questions of continued sovereignty 
and the ability of such States to continue to function in the international sphere. 
These issues are discussed by Jenny Grote-Stoutenburg in Chapter 3, and Chapters 
8–11 examine the legal status of persons displaced by climate change and the various 
options for accommodating them in new locations. 
It should, however, be borne in mind that the rise in sea level will be a 
gradual and an episodic process. As long ago as 1989 a Commonwealth Secretariat 
Expert Group suggested a “variety of ways in which ... it would be possible for many 
inhabited low lying islands to adapt, albeit with external assistance.”20 Webb and 
Kench’s recent study, mentioned earlier, also suggests that sea level rise may lead to 
unanticipated outcomes, especially in coral island contexts.21 Although we should not 
ignore the problems of complete inundation discussed earlier, planning in the short 
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and medium term is important to facilitate effective cooperation needed to combat 
the less dire short-term effects of sea level rise. Customary international law, as 
Soons suggests, does provide mechanisms to meet many of the novel situations 
presented by the effects of sea level rise.22 
 A  4. Response Options 
 B  4.1. Planned Retreat and Relocation 
The easiest option, in one sense at least, is to do nothing. Rather than attempting to 
protect the coast and stabilize its present location, one possibility would be to simply 
manage the impacts of rising sea levels. Such an approach would allow coastlines to 
find their own “natural equilibrium,” thus avoiding the need to construct costly sea 
defenses.23 The disadvantages of such an essentially passive response, however, are 
all too obvious. Such an approach would necessarily lead to the inundation of coastal 
territory, the displacement of populations, the loss of built-up areas and associated 
infrastructure, and the sacrifice of important coastal habitats such as wetlands.24 It is 
therefore doubtful that such a “do-nothing” policy would prove to be politically 
acceptable.25 Nonetheless, such approaches, that recognize increased dynamism in 
the coastal zone, could provide for coastal development that is responsive rather than 
resistant to change. In this context a “planned retreat” would include 
removing/relocating coastal developments after defined “setbacks” are encroached on 
through coastal erosion.26 
For small Island States, the option of simply allowing the landward 
encroachment of low water lines is even less attractive than for mainland continental 
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States, because several small Island States have severely restricted territorial extents. 
There is little scope for the coastline to retreat before islands may have to be 
abandoned in their entirety. Indeed, in some States this process is already occurring. 
In 2005 a decision was made to relocate the 2,600 inhabitants of the Cateret Islands 
of Papua New Guinea in response to rising sea levels.27 Similarly, in 2006, the Indian 
island of Lohachara, located in the Sundarbans region where the Ganges and 
Brahmaputra rivers empty into the Bay of Bengal and once the home to 10,000 
people, was reportedly evacuated because of the impacts of sea level rise, albeit “as a 
precaution.”28 
 B  4.2. Protecting the Coast 
A traditional means of protecting, or at least attempting to protect, a threatened 
coastline from erosion is implementation of the “bulkhead” policy. 29 Hard 
engineering options, such as the construction of sea walls, groins, and wave reduction 
structures – notably revetments, offshore breakwaters, rock armor, and gabions – are 
intended to stabilize the position of the coast and protect key infrastructure located in 
the coastal zones.30 It is generally accepted that coastal States can, by implementing 
such measures, stabilize portions of their baselines and thereby preserve their 
associated maritime zone entitlements. 31 While tried and tested, this approach has 
also repeatedly demonstrated that such construction can result in significant and 
problematic consequential impacts, including interrupting natural sediments flows 
and causing unexpected erosion and/or deposition to other parts of the coast.32 
Indeed, the impacts of such hard defenses are not confined to the coastal zone they 
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were designed to protect. Instead, the interruption of natural erosional processes in 
one area of a coast can affect adjoining coastal areas, depriving them of their 
sediment supply. In areas where there is already coastal erosion, the bulkhead policy 
may lead to an acceleration of the natural erosion rate. In one well-documented case 
on the east coast of England the erosion rate along 15 km of unprotected coast 
adjoining a section of seawall increased fourfold over a 50-year period. 33 Even in 
areas of coastal deposition, such as estuaries, coastal wetlands, and sand dunes, the 
deprivation of sediment caused by a bulkhead policy may reduce or prevent accretion 
that may, in turn, result in increased flood damage to low-lying coastal hinterlands as 
sea level rise continues. 34 
These types of impacts are especially problematic in the context of coral 
islands, which depend on uninterrupted sediment flows to sustain the island-building 
processes that maintain their integrity: “[t]he physical dynamics of sediment supply 
and transport are critical factors in the context of management of rocky and 
sedimentary oceanic islands.”35 Consequently, often such approaches have been 
criticized as large scale, costly, disruptive, and resulting in “unfortunate and 
sometimes very serious unintended consequences.”36 Instead, an ecosystem-based 
and sustainable management approach is especially relevant in the management of 
coral cays and other islands associated with coral reefs.37 
Unilateral action by one State may have considerable effects on its neighbors. 
It can be argued that, by analogy with situations that have arisen along shared or 
transboundary rivers, action by one national authority in building a bulkhead that 
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deprives another area in another State of sediment could give rise to liability under 
international law.38 For instance, sediment transport studies within the North Sea 
suggest that fine-grained sediment, derived from the cliff erosion on the east coast of 
England, comprises an important source of suspended material in the North Sea that 
is vital for the accretion of coastal mudflats and marshes bordering Wadden Sea 
States.39 In this instance, a bulkhead policy by one State that seeks to preserve the 
current coastal morphology may seriously exacerbate the problems faced by its 
neighbors. In West Africa, Shannon demonstrated that a combination of seawall 
construction, harbor building, and damming of inland rivers, by depriving the coast 
of sediment, has led to accelerated erosion in neighboring States.40  
Boyle points out that the Trail Smelter Arbitration41 and the Corfu Channel 
cases42 “have long supported the proposition that no State may cause or permit its 
territory to be used to inflict serious harm on other States.”43 It seems clear, therefore, 
given the current state of awareness of the global nature of the world ecosystem, that 
a State does not have the right to behave, even in its own territory, in a way that 
damages its neighbors. Most international environmental lawyers now agree that the 
behavior of one State that adversely affects shared areas or even damages its own 
territory in a manner that affects the global ecosystem will give rise to responsibility 
by that State to others. Of course, a chain of causation must be proved to establish 
responsibility, and indirect damage may be virtually impossible to prove. 
Faced with increasing criticism of hard engineering structures on the coast, 
engineers and coastal managers have examined alternatives that use the natural 
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coastline to absorb wave energy and prevent erosion. For example, in 1992 a UK 
government report stated, 
 EXT  Increasing realization of the effectiveness [of natural coastal systems] 
has led engineers to question the value of traditional coastal defences or 
protective structures. Instead they are examining solutions to coastal problems 
which seek to control or emulate natural systems rather than to replace them. 
This has become known as soft engineering – the solution of coastal 
management problems through environmentally sensitive schemes which 
involve substantial or total utilization of natural systems as an integral part of 
the solution. These are more consistent with ecological principles and other 
conservation interests as well as having greater social acceptability.44 
Nevertheless, despite the known and notable drawbacks of the bulkhead 
policy, this hard engineering approach may remain appropriate to protect especially 
valuable parts of the coast. Such high-value locations may include key coastal 
locations such as cities (salient, though not necessarily ideal examples include the 
system of levees at New Orleans and the seawall surrounding Male in the 
Maldives).45 
It is also conceivable that States may seek to preserve critical basepoints in 
this way; Japan’s efforts to preserve its southernmost territory, Okinotorishima 
perhaps represents the most extreme example in this context. Okinotorishima (also 
known as Douglas Reef) comprises two groups of very small rocks resting on top of 
a relatively broad coral reef platform. These features are only marginally above the 
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high-water mark and are vulnerable to erosion.46 Japan takes the view that these 
features are islands capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf rights. To 
protect the above-water rocks making up Okinotorishima, in the late 1980s Japan 
constructed sea defenses, vertically higher than the islets themselves, which form a 
360-degree ring around each of the threatened features. It should be noted that 
Japan’s extensive maritime claims from Okinotorishima have been protested by other 
States. In particular, both China and the Republic of Korea have expressed the view 
that these features are no more than “rocks” within the meaning of LOSC Article 
121(3).47 
This type of approach, however, is clearly not suited to all coastlines. For 
example, it has been suggested that the cost of Japan’s sea defenses around 
Okinotorishima exceeded US$200 million.48 Moreover, Lewis has pointed out the 
problems of building traditional sea defenses for Fanafuti, the main island of Tuvalu 
on which 2,700 of the country’s total population of 8,500 live: 
 EXT  The land form of Fanafuti is so narrow and attenuated that in order to 
protect its 2.5 square kilometers, 54 kilometers of sea defences would have to 
be constructed. Moreover, so narrow is the land form for much of its length 
that sea defences on one side would be protecting the back of sea defences on 
the other with nothing in between.49 
In addition, the land behind the defense would have to be raised to prevent flooding 
from within resulting from the porous character of the coral rock which these features 
predominantly comprise. The situation is similar in many other coral islands.50 
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An analogous approach, and one long practiced by low-lying coastal States 
such as the Netherlands, has been to undertake reclamation projects as a means to 
build up or extend coasts. A related response by threatened island States could be the 
construction of artificial or even floating islands. Indeed, the Maldives is actively 
pursuing precisely this type of strategy. Its objective is reportedly to construct 
multiple large artificial islands, elevated to approximately 3 m above sea level and 
reinforced with concrete, to provide safe refuges for the country’s population.51 
Although it is acknowledged that, in accordance with the terms of Article 60(8) of 
the LOSC, artificial islands, together with artificial installations and structures “do 
not possess the status of islands,” “have no territorial sea of their own,” and are 
excluded from affecting maritime boundary delimitation, there appears to be nothing 
to prevent the extension and, arguably, preservation of a naturally formed feature 
through reclamation works. 
 B  4.3. Using Basepoints 
At the core of the legal questions relating to potential impacts of sea level rise on 
national claims to maritime jurisdiction is Article 5 of the LOSC. This article, which 
is generally taken to represent customary international law, provides that “the normal 
base line for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low water line along 
the coast as marked on large scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.”52 
Such normal baselines represent the predominant type of baselines worldwide. As 
discussed earlier and in Chapter 5, it has long been recognized that parts of the coast 
can be dynamic and can change location and configuration in relatively short periods 
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of time. Consequently, as normal baselines change or “ambulate,” so too will the 
maritime jurisdictional limits measured from them.53 Although the 1982 Convention 
does not touch on this issue, it is possible to reach such a view through a “negative 
implication” of the LOSC (laid out in depth by Rayfuse in Chapter 7). This 
represents a critical concern in the context of sea level rise. 
As Rayfuse further describes, Article 7 of the LOSC permits a coastal State to 
use straight baselines “in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut 
into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in the immediate vicinity.”54 
States that use this system, derived from the judgment of the International Court of 
Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case,55 must comply with other technical 
conditions56: for example, straight baselines may only be drawn from “appropriate 
points” – islands and other features that are above water at high tide – and low-tide 
elevations may only be used as basepoints if “lighthouses or similar installations 
which are permanently above sea level have been built on them.” 
However, such straight-line baselines are also potentially threatened by sea 
level rise, because the basepoints, which “anchor” or tie the defined baselines, may 
also be inundated and may therefore lose their legal effect.57 In such a case, if a low-
water line may be maintained by extensive and, of course, expensive artificial 
construction, then using similar artificial means to bolster basepoints may also be a 
legitimate way by which a country can maintain straight baseline points. The 
artificial maintenance of islets, rocks, and other similar features may prevent them 
from becoming low-tide elevations. In addition, new artificial installations may be 
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built on low-tide elevations to bring them within the terms of Article 7(4). Indeed, 
coastal States are likely to use the proviso of Article 7 – that the drawing of baselines 
to and from low-tide elevations is permissible if it “has received general international 
recognition” – to argue that if features listed on charts subsequently submerge, they 
can maintain legal status because they have already received the required 
recognition.58 
In circumstances specified by Article 7 of the LOSC, coastal States are 
allowed to use straight baselines joining headlands, islands, rocks, and other features. 
The disappearance of key geographical features that are used as basepoints, and on 
which the limits of such claims depend, as a result of sea level rise could have 
significant impacts on the States. As noted earlier, this threat to the extent of national 
maritime jurisdictional claims is especially significant for coastal States, such as 
Bangladesh, that have large stretches of low-lying coasts. Indeed, where a broad 
coastline regresses rapidly, as in the case of areas of Bangladesh where erosion rates 
are up to 140 meters a year,59 the cumulative effect can be quite substantial. In fact, it 
was in recognition of Bangladesh’s situation that Article 7(2) of the LOSC was 
drafted. It permits, in restricted circumstances, straight baselines to be maintained 
notwithstanding the movement of the actual coast: 
 EXT  Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural conditions 
the coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points (i.e. for straight 
baselines) may be selected along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water 
line and, notwithstanding the subsequent regression [sic] of the low-water 
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line, the straight baseline shall remain effective until changed by the coastal 
State in accordance with this Convention. 
Although this provision was drafted for specific circumstances, it has long been 
recognized that it could be used in response to sea level rise. Most notably, more than 
twenty years ago some already argued that there was a risk that in the context of sea 
level rise this limited exception would be used more widely than was contemplated 
by, or many might regard as legitimate under, the LOSC regime.60 The reality of 
changing baselines in the twenty-first century may, however, prompt attempts to use 
a much broader application of these provisions. 
 B  4.4. Islands 
Analogous issues arise in respect of the use of  islands as basepoints for the 
generation of maritime claims. Under Article 121(1), an “island” is “a naturally 
formed area of land surrounded by water” and is entitled to claim the full suite of 
maritime zones.61 This claim is, however, subject to the important qualification in 
Article 121(3) that “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life 
of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”62 Although 
considerable controversy surrounds Article 121(3),63 there is at least prima-facie 
evidence that it has been recognized as customary international law.64 Whatever the 
merits of that debate, sea level rise might well cause low-lying islands to disappear 
entirely or to lose so much of their area or their freshwater lens as to become 
uninhabitable and thus be transformed into “rocks,” thereby causing them to lose 
their entitlement to previously established maritime zones. 
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Soons’ pioneering paper of 1990 explored several options open to a coastal 
State and islands facing such a situation.65 The weight of doctrinal opinion suggests 
that the artificial enhancement of an existing rock, so as to make it habitable or 
capable of sustaining an economic life of its own, does not transform it into an island 
capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf rights. However, the artificial 
maintenance of an island to prevent it from becoming a “rock” for the purposes of 
Article 121(3) might, Soons thinks, be permissible.66 Certainly, the downgrading of a 
feature’s classification from a small island, or “islet” under the terms of Article 
121(1), to a “rock” under Article 121(3) would pose considerable difficulties in 
determining the status of the maritime zones that it had previously generated, 
particularly because these maritime zones may have been recognized by other States 
as being under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the State to which it belongs. This 
situation is exacerbated when the maritime claims of States in possession (or, indeed, 
entirely composed) of low-elevation islands are also under threat from sea level rise; 
– especially where small, remote, and low-lying islands give rise to significant 
maritime jurisdictional entitlements. In such cases, Soons suggests that we may see 
the emergence of a new rule of customary international law that “[c]oastal States are 
entitled, in the case of landward shifting of the baseline as a result of sea level rise, to 
maintain the outer limits of the territorial sea and of the EEZ where they were located 
at a certain moment in accordance with the general rules in force at that time.”67 
Moreover, baseline changes could have a bearing on the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries that are not yet settled. It has long been accepted that, once 
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international maritime boundaries are established by treaty, they do not change 
except through agreement among the parties concerned. Once fixed, therefore, 
maritime boundaries generally do not shift position if, for example, a basepoint 
contributing to the construction of the boundary line in question disappears. This is 
because boundary treaties have a privileged status in the international law of treaties 
and are not subject to change even in the case of “subsequent fundamental change of 
circumstances,”68 such as the disappearance of an important basepoint.69 
 B  4.5. Fixing/Declaring Baselines and/or Maritime Limits 
An alternative to physical intervention is for coastal States to try to preserve their 
baselines and maritime rights through legal means. This strategy would not resolve 
the issue of inundation of vulnerable low-lying areas. The legal options, however, 
might well preserve the State’s rights over the valuable marine resources that could 
offer economic support to populations displaced as a result of sea level rise. 
Among these options (laid out in detail in Chapter 7), the most promising 
methods under existing law would be to unilaterally fix maritime jurisdictional 
claims, decoupling them from ambulatory normal baselines. The justification here 
comes from Article 5 of the LOSC, which provides that “the normal baseline for 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low water line along the coast as 
marked on large scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state.”70 This 
language suggests that the key requirement is that the chart be recognized by the 
coastal States. Consequently, if States do not update their charts to reflect the loss of 
land territory or basepoints, then the LOSC suggests that the coastal State can be the 
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arbiter of its own baselines. Although this could benefit the coastal State, a policy of 
not updating charts would pose potential dangers to seafarers as official charts 
become more and more inaccurate over time. A dual charts system of official charts 
for maritime jurisdictional purposes and navigational charts, however, could resolve 
this problem. 
The more ambitious option would be to negotiate a formal treaty. There is no 
clear model for creating such a treaty, although options exist, some of which are laid 
out in Chapter 7, The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is 
one option. It has provisions for creating new protocols, but has become almost 
moribund over the last five years, and the 194 parties are currently struggling to 
negotiate a regime that will come into effect after the Kyoto Protocol commitment 
period expires in 2012. In 1994, Freestone argued for a sea level rise protocol to be 
part of the UNFCCC, but such a protocol is unlikely to be a high priority in the 
current round of negotiations.71 Another option, although similarly unlikely, is to 
amend the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. In a detailed study, Freestone and Oude 
Elferink have explored the reasons why States have avoided the complex amendment 
procedures of the LOSC for both pragmatic and political reasons.72 There is also 
growing momentum, discussed in Chapter 9, for a treaty or other agreement to deal 
with climate-displaced persons in a way that could also create a solution to some 
aspects of the maritime zone dilemma. 
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 A  5. Conclusions 
Sea level rise, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, appears destined to continue and may 
accelerate, even if the emissions of greenhouse gases are brought under control and 
their levels ultimately decline. As the global climate system works to bring itself into 
equilibrium, historical records of times when the global atmosphere had similar 
levels of greenhouse gases (albeit not from anthropogenic causes) suggest 
substantially higher sea levels in the decades to come. 
The implications of higher sea levels for the territorial integrity of some 
States are substantial. These implications involve both the inward-looking landward 
intrusions of water on low-lying areas and also the outward-looking impacts on 
maritime zones. These threats were well identified by scholars, cited earlier, writing 
more than two decades ago when the phenomenon of sea level rise was first mooted. 
The passing of the years has clarified both the reality of this threat and the severity of 
the long-term trends. It is important, however, to appreciate that, whatever the 
inevitable very long-term impacts may be in the coming centuries, in the next several 
decades it will most likely be a gradual and an episodic process. It is also highly 
likely to be variable both in scale and place – for already it is clear that globally it is 
not a uniform process – and that both spatial and temporal variability will add 
considerably to the uncertainties. Although sea level rise clearly has the potential to 
be cataclysmic, in its early impacts there is some hope that it may be more 
manageable in certain locations. For example, Webb and Kench’s recent study 
showed that 86% of Pacific Islands studied are stable or have increased in size over 
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the last few decades despite the higher than average reported sea level rise in the 
central Pacific region. Natural movements of material such as sand and silt that can 
maintain these processes are, however, impeded by the presence of human structures, 
and they may not be able to keep up with accelerating sea level rise and with the loss 
of coral reefs from ocean acidification. Hoping that natural accretion alone will 
protect the islands and not exploring alternative responses would therefore seem to be 
foolhardy. 
The main response options were also outlined years ago. These include 
construction of physical defenses and the application of legal options. Some of the 
options discussed then are repeated here. Physical defenses remain popular and may 
become more so, yet they are also problematic, not only in terms of cost but also 
because of their uncertain impacts; more sophisticated engineering solutions are 
emerging that may possibly mitigate some of the negative externalities of these 
projects. 
From a legal point of view, many have pointed out the problems that sea level 
rise poses to the complicated maritime zone regime developed by the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention. Because the maritime zones are measured from coastal baselines 
and basepoints declared or recognized by the coastal State, changes in coastline 
configuration and land inundation could have serious effects on these zones. Some 
maritime boundaries, such as those agreed by treaty, are fixed, whereas others may 
not be. However, it does seem certain that, in the short to medium term at least, 
States will be reluctant to reduce or abandon any of their maritime claims. Does law 
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therefore stand as an obstacle to reaching an accommodation with sea level rise? We 
think not: the international legal system has a lot more flexibility than it is often 
credited with. Although formal amendments to the LOSC are highly unlikely, 
because of the complexity of the procedures that are involved, as Soons pointed out 
in 1990, international customary law inevitably evolves, and so a solution or a series 
of solutions seem possible. 
The precipitous effects of sea level rise will force States to begin to use some 
of the opportunities that legal commentators have already highlighted to retain their 
existing maritime zones or at least to try to minimize their losses. As others have 
indicated, if the issue becomes pressing, the political organs of the United Nations 
are likely to become involved. All in all, we remain positive that the gradual and 
evolutionary nature of sea level rise will facilitate an orderly evolution of the legal 
regime. 
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